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Abstract—Assurance Cases (ACs) are used for justifying sys-
tem confidence in important properties including safety, reliabil-
ity, etc. Their manual generation is time-consuming and prone to
errors. Also, AC update calls for more labour. However, there is
not an automatic solution to guide the whole engineering process
of AC generation and verification process. An executable AC
is machine readable and checkable, and brings the benefit of
efficiency and confidence of AC evolution. Thus, in this PhD, the
Model-based Engineering (MBE) techniques are exploited for an
automatic process for executable ACs. The first aim is to gen-
erate AC models automatically from system artefacts. Currently
available approaches are usually constrained to specific modelling
environments, or address only system model artefacts, or do not
cover informal and unstructured artefacts. The second aim is to
automate the evidence generation using formal verification. FM
provides a rigorously mathematical proof. But current solutions
to create formal assertions are manual and expertise-requiring.
The paper discusses on the technical problem, and the proposed
approach.
Index Terms—Assurance Case, generation, SACM, model
query, formal verification, assertion
I. INTRODUCTION
The properties of reliability, safety, maintainability, etc. are
critical for complex systems. The Assurance Case (AC) is a
systematic way to argue that the system exhibits some of these
properties supported by relevant evidences [1], and is required
by ISO26262 [2] for safety-critical systems. AC generation
involves large amounts of system lifecycle data and various
types of verification methods; and is labour-intensive and
error-prone if processed manually. As system design changes
and evolves frequently during development and operational
phase, ACs needs to be updated correspondingly to keep the
validity of the argued property. For instance, when a system
function is added, a new AC claim must be created and
substantiated by argument; when the detailed design has been
modified, the evidence to support the claim needs to be re-
verified. It is important to provide an automatic approach and
tool for AC creation. The problem we face is a missing of an
automatic solution to guide the whole engineering process of
AC generation and formal verification process [3].
The research leading to these results has received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 812.788 (MSCA-ETN SAS).
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An executable AC is machine readable and checkable, and
brings benefits of efficiency and confidence of AC generation
and evolution. This PhD is to provide an automatic solution
for assurance engineers to generate executable AC models
by Model-based Engineering (MBE) with formal verification
support. We implement the approach using RoboChart [4], a
UML-tailored language tailored for development of robotic
controllers, which provides block-based architectural and state
machine modelling notations. Since its development environ-
ment RoboTool is Eclipse-based, our method is generalizable
to other Eclipse-based modelling environment. We collaborate
with D-RisQ1 to gather engineering requirements for develop-
ing AC process and verify our approach using their robot.
The research questions are: (1) For systems developed
with RoboChart, what MBE techniques can be used for
automatic AC generation supporting various system modelling
languages? (2) For the AC claims that can be verified by
Formal Methods (FM), what phases can be automated within
RoboTool? And how do we realize the automation?
For question one, much work has addressed AC fragment
generation from system data with different levels of automa-
tion. Thanks to the maturity of MBE application in system
development process, it’s possible to generate AC models with
system models as inputs. For the purpose of automation of
traceability establishment between AC elements and system
data, model query techniques have been explored. However,
the approaches in the literature on the traceability establish-
ment either do not cover system design models [5]; or address
design models (e.g., a component design model) with a limited
applicability to different system development environments
[6]. Moreover, unstructured system data, such as spreadsheet,
is not covered. Thus, one challenge for the first research
question is the automatic establishment of traceability between
AC models and different formats of system data. This PhD first
proposes to unify the formats of system data (including system
models and unstructured data) using predefined metamodels,
automate the provenance by model query, then generate AC
structure automatically. Some AC evidence can also be created
from model query results. The approach is independent of
system data formats and modelling languages.
The AC evidence is generated from AC claim verification.
1D-RisQ Software Systems. http://www.drisq.com/.
Besides model query mentioned above, other techniques for
AC verification exist including simulation, testing, review, FM,
etc. FM provides a rigorously mathematical proof and has
been applied on AC verification at various levels. But one
challenge for the second question is that the formal assertions
are usually created manually from AC claims and require FM
expertise, which hinders the executable AC realization due to
this automation gap in FM verification. This PhD proposes to
realize an automatically checkable AC by first deriving formal
assertions from claims using Controlled Natural Languages
(CNL) and model transformation techniques, then deriving
AC evidence from assertion checking results using MBE
techniques. Other AC claim verification methods may also be
processed automatically, but is out of my research scope.
We implement the approach using Epsilon [7] for model
query, transformation, etc. The generated AC models can
further be managed with MBE capabilities, such as review
by query, comparison for update. These will be addressed in
future work. System data is input of AC generation, but data
collection from system development process is not addressed
in my approach, and will be considered in future work.
We organize the rest of paper as follows. §II discusses
related work. §III presents the approach, progress and plan.
§IV discusses possible threats to validity. §V concludes.
II. RELATED WORKS
Hawkins et al. [8] used the model weaving technique [9] to
build the relationship between system models and AC elements
at the metamodel level. The AC is generated by the pattern
instantiation. Its advantage is that the system models can
be extracted automatically. Our approach is inspired by and
expands this work to cover not only system design models but
also the unstructured data such as hazard analysis result. Gacek
et al. [6] generate AC models by querying AADL system
models. The query environment is integrated with AADL
modelling platform. We refer the model query concept in [6]
at design model level. The difference is that our approach has
no constraint on system modelling languages and is capable of
assembling with AC structure generated from other sources.
Šljivo et al. [10] derive ACs from system design pattern by
MBE which is different from generating AC directly from
system models in our work. Gallina and Nyberg [5] also utilize
model query technique to generate AC. The objective models
to be queried are the system data (e.g., test plan) compliant
with OSLC (Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration) [11]
standard. However, OSLC does not support system design
models, e.g., AADL models. The unstructured textual data is
not addressed in the work either. Our approach complements
this work. Denney and Pai [12] construct a complete AC by
automatic pattern instantiation. But the system design data are
not required to be models thus the method does not support
the generation from system design models using model query.
For FM verification of AC claims, Diskin et al. [13] and
Gleirscher et al. [14] both propose to formalize claims as as-
sertions on system formal models, but the process automation
is not addressed. Cârlan et al. [15] focuse on the consistency
checking between system data and AC elements, and exploits
model checking as one of the claim verification methods.
III. RESEARCH APPROACH AND PROGRESS
Our approach exploits MBE techniques to facilitate the
assembly and verification of AC models in an automatic
manner, as shown in Fig. 1. AC models will be compliant
with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [16].
SACM is a unifying standard for assurance cases to express
argumentation, artifact traceability, and terminology [17].
The system data produced from system development process
can be in any format, including models (e.g., EMF models),
and unstructured data (such as spreadsheet, text, etc.). For
the data used as AC inputs, we first process and convert the
unstructured data to models with predesigned metamodels;
then create AC models by querying different system models
(hazard analysis, system models, etc.) respectively. The query
rules are to be predefined for different scenarios, and kept in
a library for reuse. The AC models then shall be integrated
as a whole module. Further, the approach tackles the AC
formal verification. For the claims to be verified by FM, the
safety requirement used to generate these claims are further
used to create formal assertions. The textual requirements will
be rewritten with a CNL in its tool environment, then be
exported in a structured format, such as XML. The assertion
templates shall be defined to the target FM verification tools.
Then, based on the templates, the formal assertions will
be generated automatically by model-to-text transformation.
The FM verification results from running these assertions are
used to create the AC evidence models. The last step is to
integrate the evidence models in to the AC module, or for re-
verification, to replace the old evidence models with the newly
created ones.
Fig. 1: Automating Generation and FM Verification of ACs
A. AC generation by model query
To create an AC module, many kinds of system data are
needed, such as hazard analysis, system specification, system
architecture, verification plan and results, most of which
are unstructured. We first convert the unstructured data into
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structured models with metamodels and query rules. Each
type of document shall have its own metamodel and query
rules. The metamodels can be designed following industrial
standards such as OSLC or company internal standards.
With all relevant data converted into EMF models, we
generate AC models based on SACM metamodel, as shown
in Fig. 2. For each type of system data (e.g., hazard log, test
plan), a set of query rules is designed to create relevant AC
elements. Then, these AC models will be integrated into one
module according to their built-in relationships.
Fig. 2: SACM AC generation by model query
For system design model query, we use RoboChart for
system modelling, then obtain EMF models from RoboChart
models for model query. Consider a scenario as follows,
Claim: All states that satisfy Condition 1 shall have a transi-
tion that satisfies Condition 2.
Evidence: The transition exists for each state.
The query rules of this scenario search all the states in
RoboChart models meeting Condition 1, and create claims for
each of these states. Then, transitions of each state are checked
to identify the ones meeting Condition 2, an evidence and a
link to the claim are built for the right transitions. In between,
a strategy and a claim for verification are inserted. An AC
structure is automatically generated as follows,
Claim 1: {State S.1} that satisfies Condition 1 shall have a
transition that satisfies Condition 2.
Inference Strategy 1: Argue over verification and validation
methods of {Claim 1}.
Claim 1.1: {Claim 1} is verified by model query
result.
Evidence 1.1: {Transition T.X} exists for {State S.1}.
...
Claim N: {State S.N} that satisfies Condition 1 shall have a
transition that satisfies Condition 2.
Strategy N: Argue over verification and validation methods of
{Claim N}.
Claim N.1: {Claim N} is verified by model query
result.
Evidence N.1: {Transition T.Z} exists for {State
S.N}.
The name of states and transitions “State S.i” and “Tran-
sition T.X. . . Z” will be instantiated with concrete RoboChart
models. The numbers “N” is the exact number of states that
satisfy Condition 1. In this example, the evidence to the
claims is also generated by model query which substitutes the
manual model review. This again improves the efficiency and
avoids errors. The content to be instantiated is presented with
{}. Whenever the RoboChart models are modified, e.g., new
states added, transitions deleted, AC models can be updated
directly from system models automatically. It is noted that it
is unrealistic to have a complete set of query rules for design
models. We’ve preliminarily implemented the approach of this
section to a D-RisQ robot performing underwater maintenance
tasks. An example metamodel of a hazard log spreadsheet for
this robot with its query rules are provided online2.
B. Claim verification by FM
After generating AC structure from system data, this section
discusses the automation of claim FM verification within
RoboTool. The automation covers not only formal assertions
generation for different FM methods, but evidence model
generation from FM verification results, as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: FM Verification of AC claims within RoboTool
To implement FM verification, taking refinement checking
as an example, we need a formal specification, a formal
implementation model, and the assertion itself. RoboChart has
a formal semantics in the process algebra CSP [18] , and
RoboTool can generate their CSP formal models automatically
for verification. RoboChart is also supported by an assertion
Domain Specific Language (DSL) developed atop Machine-
Readable CSP (CSPM). The sophisticated assertions can be
translated into CSPM assertions to be run in FDR model
checker. With these advantages, we design the approach as
four phases. We first classify AC claims according to their
CSPM specification patterns, then design three types of tem-
plates for each class including CSPM specification model tem-
plate, CSPM implementation model template, and RoboChart
DSL assertion template. We identify the claims to be formally
verified in AC models, and rewrite the requirements (e.g.,
safety requirement, reliability requirement) which those claims
are derived from within a CNL tool, and further export them
in a structured format. This step will be a manual process.
2https://github.com/laila-fangyan/SACM-AC-generation-use-case.git
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A software requirement management tool Kapture3 which is
based on CNL is exploited in the approach implementation,
and the requirements are exported in XML. The assertion gen-
eration starts from extracting information from exported XML
requirements, then with the transformation rules designed for
the corresponding type of assertion template, assertions are
generated. The FM assertion checking within RoboTool will
be triggered automatically by an Eclipse plug-in. The AC
evidence models then can be derived by querying verification
results. This evidence model needs to be integrated to the
AC module generated in Section III-A. Further, to ensure
the quality of AC modules, the syntactic checking will be
performed on AC models using Epsilon Validation Language
(EVL). In this PhD, the approach will be implemented on the
RoboTool supported FDR model checker and a probabilistic
model checker PRISM, and the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
C. Progress and plan
At this stage, the AC generation approach has been imple-
mented. The AC formal verification approach has been applied
on FDR model checker within RoboTool. Claim classification
is carried out, the templates are partially developed. For the
next stage, formal verification approach needs to be applied
to PRISM for probabilistic properties and to Isabelle/HOL
theorem prover. More templates need to be developed, so
as the system model query rules. The whole approach will
be evaluated with D-RisQ robot use case and be reviewed
by engineering practitioners to assess the effectiveness of the
proposed approach in practice and against the current available
methods discussed in §II.
IV. THREAT TO VALIDITY
AC models can be generated directly by querying design
models, but not all claims are suitable to this query method,
i.e. the query rules cannot cover all claims. For the claims not
covered, the manual process might be involved. The query
rules for the system design models are the basis for AC gen-
eration. However, it’s not realistic to provide a complete set of
rules. New claims may require new rules, but the approach is
still valid. Our approach of AC generation can be implemented
to the modelling languages backed by EMF metamodels; it can
also be applicable to languages backed by other metamodels.
For those other languages, we first transform the models to
EMF models, then can follow the same process hereafter.
Formal verification automation is proposed and implemented
for RoboTool, and is not fully generalizable because CSP
assertions are of a specific form. In future work, we’d like
to address its generalization to other platforms.
V. CONCLUSION
It’s at a medium stage of my PhD, and the paper covers
the technical problem and the proposed approach. This PhD
is to design a technical solution for automating AC process by
MBE to improve efficiency and reduce errors. The AC models
are directly derived from system data based on the traceability
3https://www.drisq.com/product-kapture
built in the model query rules. This traceability triggers the
automatic update of AC models when system data changes.
The formal assertion generation is addressed to automate the
formal verification process and avoid the need of FM expertise.
The approach extends the existing work, and will contribute
a whole AC automation process, a series of query rules and
model transformation rules for different process phases. The
tentative date of the thesis defense is in December 2022.
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